Santa Clara Journal of International Law
Manuscript 1237

Ungovernable Ships at the End of their Lives and the Response of
the Hong Kong Convention: A Critical Appraisal of the Treaty on
Ship-breaking from the Perspective of South Asian Ship-breaking
Nations
Ahmed, Ishtiaque

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil
Part of the International Law Commons

18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124

Ungovernable Ships at the
End of their Lives and the
Response of the Hong Kong
Convention: A Critical
Appraisal of the Treaty on
Ship-breaking from the
Perspective of South Asian
Ship-breaking Nations
Ishtiaque Ahmed, J.S.D.*

1

*Ishtiaque Ahmed, J.S.D., University of Maine School of Law, USA; LL.M. (Maritime Law), University of London
in Association with Queen Mary and UCL; LL.B (Honors) University of London; Member Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators, London (MCIArb); Advocate of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and Barrister of Lincoln’s Inn;
Assistant Professor & Chair, Department of Law, North South University; and Non-Resident Visiting Scholar
and Affiliate Faculty, Center for Oceans and Coastal Law, University of Maine School of Law. This article is an
adapted version of a chapter of the author’s doctoral dissertation and he would like to thank his doctoral supervisor,
Professor Charles H. Norchi, J.S.D (Yale) and Readers Professor Martin A. Rogoff and Attorney Timothy
Steigelman, Esq. for their useful comments on that chapter; all errors or inadequacies are the author’s alone.

124

Ungovernable Ships at the End of their Lives and the Response of the Hong Kong Convention
Abstract:
Ship-breaking on beaches is widely known to cause pollution and is among the most
dangerous occupations in the world. After three decades of prevailing mobocracy, particularly
in the three chief ship recycling nations of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, in 2009, the
International Maritime Organization finally adopted the Hong Kong Convention, as a result
of mounting pressure from international communities including various environmental groups,
NGOs, mass media, and human right activists. However, this much awaited convention
protecting the marine environment has not been enforced yet due to the lack of ratification by
key ship recycling states caused by competing conflicts of interest and significant
disagreements among the dominant stakeholders of this industry. Leading environmental and
labor activists claim that the convention is extremely pro-business in character and has heavily
favored the industry and entities with active shipping interest at the expense of labor rights and
the coastal environment. On the other hand, shipping and ship-breaking industries maintain
that early ratification of this convention is the only effective solution to the current problems.
Through a doctrinal analysis, this article addresses the challenging question of this
convention’s efficacy in ensuring sustainable, safe and environmentally sound recycling of
ships by breaking down its key terms and provisions. The article ends with policy
recommendations for the International Maritime Organization, which adopted this convention
in 2009 amidst significant protest and criticism of both labor and environmental activists.

125

18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124
I.

Introduction ................................................................................................................128

II.

Origin and Evaluation of the Hong Kong Convention. .............................................128

III.

The Structure of the Hong Kong Convention. ...........................................................130

IV.

The Salient Features of the Hong Kong Convention. ................................................132
A. Approach to Health, Safety and the Environment. ..............................................132
B. Placing Unnecessary Stress on Settled Issues. .....................................................134
C. Approach of Using Technology in Ship-breaking. ..............................................134
D. Approach to Downstream Management of Hazardous Waste. ............................135
E. Definition of Ship in the Hong Kong Convention. ..............................................135
F. Definition of Ship Recycling Activity..................................................................136
G. Uncertainty in the Range of Recycling Activity and the Prediction of the
Convention. ..........................................................................................................136
H. Delegation of the Task of Recycling to Third Party by the Ship Recycling
Facility..................................................................................................................137
I. Sailing Under the Authority of a Flag: An Innovative Approach of the Hong Kong
Convention. ..........................................................................................................138
J. Relinquishment of Essential Jurisdiction with No Good Reason. .......................138
K. ‘No More Favorable Treatment’ Provision of the Hong Kong Convention:
A Redundant Provision. .......................................................................................141
L. A Universal Technical Method for Diversified Technical Needs. .......................143
M. Inconsistency in Approach with Inbuilt Hazardous Materials. ............................143

IV.

The Survey and Certifications of Ships under the Hong Kong Convention. .............144

V.

The Port State Control and the Hong Kong Convention. ..........................................147

VI.

Hot Work and Gas Free Certifications of Ships Before Recycling............................147

VII.

Preparation for Ship Recycling, Pre-cleaning and Approval of a Dangerous
Method. ......................................................................................................................148

VIII.

The Convention’s Role in Preventing a Race to the Bottom in Ship Recycling
Business. ....................................................................................................................148

IX.

Safety and Environmental Protection. .......................................................................149

X.

Pre-cleaning, Gas Free and Hot Work Certifications. ................................................150

XI.

Inspection and Detection of Violations. .....................................................................153

XII.

Communication and Information. ..............................................................................156

126

Ungovernable Ships at the End of their Lives and the Response of the Hong Kong Convention
XIII.

The Concept of a Single Contact Point Under the Convention. ................................157

XIV.

The Responsibility of the Flag State. .........................................................................157

XV.

Recycling State’s Obligations. ...................................................................................160

XVI. Flag States’ Role in Ship Recycling...........................................................................161
XVII. Recognition of Hazardous Wastes. ............................................................................162
XVIII. The Duties of the Ship Recycling Facilities. .............................................................163
XIX. Ship Owner’s Responsibility......................................................................................164
XX.

Workers’ Rights, Safety and Training. .......................................................................166

XXI. Adoption of the Hong Kong Convention and Stakeholders’ Participation. ...............168
XXII. Conclusion and Recommendations ............................................................................172

127

18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124
I.

Introduction
The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound

Recycling of Ships (“Hong Kong Convention” or “HKC”) is a multilateral treaty on shipbreaking adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”) in
2009. This international convention is designed to control commercial ship-breaking activities
around the world. Ship-breaking, widely known as a ‘pollution haven,’ is the most dangerous
occupation worldwide, particularly when it is carried out on the tidal part of the beach.1
Nonetheless, it is an essential activity for the sustainability of the global shipping industry. The
Hong Kong Convention also recognizes ship recycling as the most environmentally sound way
to dispose of end of life ships from international waters.
II.

Origin and Evaluation of the Hong Kong Convention.
By the end of 1990s, when commercial ship-breaking had become virtually nonexistent

in the developed world,2 the anarchy in the beach breaking industry across the South Asian
region became a notable global concern. In March of 2000, IMO was first notified about this
concern through its Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) during its 44th session.3
This IMO initiative was triggered predominantly by three decades of mobocracy prevailing in
the three-giant ship recycling nations: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Mounting pressure from
various environmental groups such as Greenpeace, NGO Shipbreaking Platform and various
local NGOs, human right activists, and mass media, however, caused concern for this specialized
agency of the United Nations (UN), an intergovernmental organization responsible for the
adoption of maritime regulations for global shipping communities, and other inter-governmental
organizations.4 Following the 44th session of the MEPC, a correspondence group was formed to
collect information about the existing ship recycling practice and to give advice on the role of the
1

M. JAMALUDDIN AHMED & MD. NAZRUL ISLAM, THE MOST DANGEROUS JOB ON THE PLANET ─ SHIPBREAKING

IN BANGLADESH, (Lambert Acad. Publishing 2016).
2 Morshedul Hoque & Dr. Md Masum Emran, Role of

Ship-breaking Industries in Bangladesh and ILO Guidelines:
A Critical Discussion, 16 GLOBAL J. HUM. SOC. SCI.: E 19 (2016), https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume16/EJournal_GJHSS_(E)_Vol_16_Issue_3.pdf.
3 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Historic Background, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/
ShipRecycling/Pages/Default.aspx.
4 Dr. Nikos Mikelis, Hong Kong Convention: The Origins of a Convention Seminar at Malmö: World Maritime
University, (Feb. 10, 2012).
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IMO in ship recycling, including the development of measures required to prepare a ship for
recycling.
Ship-breaking involves knowledge of the maritime industry, labor rights, and disposal of
hazardous materials. Various specialized UN agencies, primarily IMO, the Secretariat of the
Basel Convention, and International Labour Organization (ILO), but also public and private
stakeholders, were anticipated to be involved in the preparatory discussion.5 The IMO accepted
jurisdiction6 and agreed that it should develop a non-mandatory guideline using the industry code
of practice for ship recycling to be adopted by the IMO assembly.7 In July 2003, at the 49th
meeting of the MEPC, the IMO approved the draft guidelines for ship recycling.8 These
guidelines were subsequently adopted by the IMO assembly via resolution A.962 (23).9 The
guidelines were later amended by resolution A.980 (24) in December 2005.10
Ship-breaking activities involve interplay of multinational stakeholders ranging from the
weakest to the strongest entities, members with tremendous conflict of interest between
numerous state and non-state actors, including individual persons and the environment. Since its
adoption in 2003, it was soon apparent that a voluntary guideline is insufficient to regulate this
international industry. In MEPC’s 53rd meeting in 2005, it unanimously agreed that without a
binding legal instrument, it would be impossible to create harmony governing this industry.11
MEPC passed Resolution A .981 (24) to direct the development of a new convention covering
the entire life cycle of a ship from design and construction, to preparation for ship-breaking

5

Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Meeting Report: Discussions on the Global Programme for Sustainable Ship
Recycling (Jan. 12-13, 2008), http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/download.aspx?d=UNEP-CHW-SHIPS-GPSSR.1REP.English.pdf.
6 K. P. Jain, J. F. J. Pruyn, & J. J. Hopman, Critical Analysis of the Hong Kong International Convention on Ship
Recycling, 7 INT’L J. ENVTL., CHEMICAL, EGOLOGICAL, GEOLOGICAL & GEOPHYSICAL ENG’G 686 (2013).
7 Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), Meeting Summaries of 47th session (Mar. 4-8, 2002), http://
www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=109&doc_id=1753.
8 MEPC, Meeting Summaries of 49th session (July 14-18, 2003), http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?
topic_id=109&doc_id=2798.
9 IMO, The development of the Hong Kong Convention, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/
ShipRecycling/Pages/Default.aspx.
10 IMO, Historic Background, supra note 3.
11 IMO, Report of the Marine Environment Protection Committee on Its Fifty-Third Session, § 3, ¶ 3.24, http://
www.crs.hr/Portals/0/docs/eng/imo_iacs_eu/imo/mepc_reports/MEPC53.pdf?ver=2010-11-04-101906-000.
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without compromising operational efficiency.12 This convention was intended to govern all
stakeholders involved in regulating and management of end-of-life (“EOL”) ships with various
reporting requirements. MEPC’s 54th meeting convened a working group, per the instruction of
IMO assembly 24, and drafted the initial version of the convention based on an earlier proposal
by Norway,13 one of the top ten ship owning nations of the world.14 In 2009, a series of meetings
took place in Hong Kong in the presence of 63 delegates from IMO member states, which finally
led to the adoption of the Hong Kong Convention and six resolutions. 15
Maritime conventions of IMO have all been adopted promptly as a response to one or
more major casualties at sea16 affecting predominantly the interest of those in the maritime
transport industry. The Hong Kong Convention is perhaps the single exception to this longstanding tradition. Almost 40 years of anarchy in the ship-breaking industry in South Asia and
the outcry of environmental and labor activists have been catalysts for the development of this
convention.17 However in March 2009,18 the apex court of the largest ship-breaking state,
Bangladesh, ordered the instant shut-down of ship-breaking activity for an indefinite period of
time.19 This raised a red flag in the global shipping community and appears to have offered the
final push that brought forth the convention swiftly, just within two month of the Supreme Court
Judgment delivered on 19 May 2009.
III.

The Structure of the Hong Kong Convention.
The provisions of the Hong Kong Convention have been arranged in three different

annexes. The first annex includes twenty-one articles that deal with the core substantive and
12

Id.
Jain, Pruyn & Hopman, supra note 6.
14 Infographic: Norway as a Ship owning Nation, WORLD MARITIME NEWS (May 24, 2017), https://
worldmaritimenews.com/archives/220753/infographic-norway-as-a-shipowning-nation/.
15 Mikelis, Hong Kong Convention, supra note 4.
16 Erik Hollnagel, Michael Baldauf, Sarah Hofmann & Aditi Kataria, Maritime Human Factors and IMO Policy, 40
MAR. POL’Y & MGMT. 243 (2013).
17 Mikelis, Hong Kong Convention, supra note 4.
18 Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) v. Government of Bangladesh, Writ Petition (Civil) No.
7260, Bangladesh Supreme Court 18 (2008), http://bdpil.org/assets/uploads/pdf/c86f3-judgement-shipbreaking-7260-of-2008.pdf.
19 Environmentalists call this the “dumping ground” for world merchant ships. See Anbarasan Ethirajan, Bangladesh
ship breaking workers die after inhaling gas, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-15334152.
13
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procedural provisions. The second annex titled “Regulations for Safe and Environmentally
Sound Recycling of Ships” includes twenty-five regulations arranged in four chapters. These
regulations incorporate the technical details required to effectively implement the core provisions
of the convention stipulated in the first annex. The third annex includes seven appendixes.
Except appendix 1 and 2, all the appendixes contain standard format for various certification
procedures. Appendix 1 covers the list of hazardous materials and appendix 2 includes a
minimum list of items for the “inventory of hazardous materials” (IHM).
The Hong Kong Convention has been criticized for placing the provisions of the
convention covering substantive rights protecting workers and the environment outside the main
body of the text, making them easily amendable.20 However, this criticism has been countered by
an argument that the dual-tier mechanism would make the convention easily adaptable to the
modern needs and circumstances.21 Any future technical development could therefore be
incorporated easily when available.22
Both the articles and regulations, irrespective of their placement in the convention text,
carry the same importance and strength in enforcement.23 Six sets of voluntary guidelines have
also been incorporated. It is expected that these voluntary guidelines would help the convention
in its early implementation. Although voluntary, their reference within the core text of the
convention have given them a special status. Certain core provisions such as preparation of ship
recycling plan (SRP) or ship recycling facility plan (SRFP) under the Hong Kong Convention
may largely depend on how these guidelines are being interpreted by an individual state.24

20

Candidate no. 5006, International Law and Ship Recycling, 33 (Oct. 31, 2010) (Master’s Thesis) (on file with the
University of Oslo).
21 N. Matz-Lück, Safe and Sound Scrapping of ‘Rusty Buckets’? The 2009 Hong Kong Ship Recycling Convention,
19 REV. EUROPEAN COMMUN. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 95, 95-103 (2010), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/
10.1111/j.1467-9388.2010.00667.x.
22 International Law and Ship Recycling, supra note 20.
23 The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, art. 1.5,
May 19, 2009, IMO Doc. SR/CONF/45 [hereinafter HKC].
24 MARIA SARRAF ET. AL, SHIP BREAKING AND RECYCLING INDUSTRY IN BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN, WORLD
BANK REPORT 24 (2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/
223546-1296680097256/Shipbreaking.pdf.
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IV.

The Salient Features of the Hong Kong Convention.
The Hong Kong Convention imposes general obligations on each party, to give full and

complete effect to its provisions in their national legislation.25 Additionally, member states shall
ensure compliance of the convention’s obligations to prevent, reduce, minimize and to the extent
practicable, eliminate accidents, injuries, and other adverse effects on human health and
environment caused by ship recycling.26 The standard of compliance is dependent on the
methods used for ship recycling.
A. Approach to Health, Safety and the Environment.
The Hong Kong Convention has taken a typical approach to health and safety, but a
nontraditional approach to environmental protection. It has not provided any universally
applicable methods to minimize ship-breaking’s pollution or impact on human health, except
setting a standard of ‘practicability.’ 27 Practicability may widely vary within the contracting
states, between recyclers within a state, or within one recycler at different times and
circumstances. When judged in terms of financial or technological capability, practicability raises
further ethical questions. When does it become justifiable to continue business without avoiding
predictable risk of death or grievous bodily harm at a workplace because it is not “practicable”
for a recycler on financial grounds? According to the standard set by the Hong Kong Convention,
a foreseeable case of death or injury may still be tolerated if, for example, it jeopardizes smooth
profitable production in business, because it could be argued as a relevant practical circumstance
of an employer based on his lack of financial capability to invest in safety. If the word
‘practicability’ in the convention has a subjective meaning, each party would tend to argue it has
different obligations from the same convention.
In any standard health and safety law directed upon the employers to prevent human
casualty and injury at work, the use of the terms ‘reasonably practicable,’ ‘reasonable and

25

HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.1.
Id. at art. 1.
27 Id.
26
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practicable,’ or ‘as far as reasonably practical’ are common. 28 The HKC uses the words
‘practicable’ six times, while the word ‘reasonable’ has been deleted from three specific
provisions related to the duty on recyclers as well as the competent authority (CA) to ensure the
safety of workers and safeguard to the environment.29 The two other provisions relating squarely
to business, e.g. excluding jurisdiction over the ships below 500 DWT30 and naval or war ships,31
however, are required to be ‘reasonable and practicable.’ The duty of existing ship-owners to
prepare the inventory of hazardous materials (IHM) needs to be only ‘practicable’ without a
‘reasonableness’ qualifier.32 In the Hong Kong Convention, there is therefore clear evidence of
heedful use of words favoring business interest of ship-owners and recyclers, omitting the
concerns of labor welfare and environmental protection.
This ideology of prioritizing business over safety can be considered an artifact of
barbarism. This may promote arguments regarding monetary compensation for a predictable loss
of life of a human being or permanent injury. This strategy downplays the precious cost of
human life which is inestimable, irrespective of social and economic status. By not clarifying the
meaning of “practicability,” this provision puts the safety and life of workers on equivalent
footing as production and profit in business. This compromise is a shift from IMO’s traditional

28

See e.g. Sec 2(1), 2(2) , 2(2)(a) , 2(2)(b) , 2(2)(c) of the Health and Safety at Work 1974 Act (UK) applies to ship
recycling that reads
Sec. 2. General duties of employers to their employees
(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety
and welfare at work of all his employees.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of an employer's duty under the preceding subsection, the matters
to which that duty extends include in particular—
(a) the provision and maintenance of plant and systems of work that are, so far as is reasonably
practicable, safe and without risks to health;
(b) arrangements for ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, safety and absence of risks to health in
connection with the use, handling, storage and transport of articles and substances;
(c) the provision of such information, instruction, training and supervision as is necessary to ensure, so
far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety at work of his employee…
See Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, c. 37, § 2 (UK).
29 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5, 17, 18 art. 1, 3.
30 Id. at art. 3.3.
31 Id. at art. 3.2.
32 Id. at Reg. 5.2.
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mandate to promote a ‘safety first’ culture and environmental stewardship as one of IMO’s
pillars for sustainable maritime development. 33
B. Placing Unnecessary Stress on Settled Issues.
In Article 1.2, the HKC allows state parties to take more stringent measures than what is
stated in the convention itself. 34 However, the purpose of any international law is to set a
minimum benchmark acceptable to state parties to facilitate expansion, increase efficiency, and
guarantee fairness in dealing in an integrated global market. State parties, therefore, have every
right to impose a higher standard than the minimum demanded by the Hong Kong Convention,
without needing the express incorporation of its Article 1.2 provision. Indeed, this provision is
redundant and could instead be misused as a tool to foster discrimination between party ships
and facilities and those of nonparties.35
C. Approach of Using Technology in Ship-breaking.
The convention has urged contracting parties to encourage each other to use technologies
available to them and exert continuous effort towards the development of technology which
would contribute to the safe and environmentally sound recycling of ships.36 This industry has no
shortage of technology, however access to such technology has been a prime concern for the
global communities involved in ship-breaking in the last 40 years. Advanced technology is
currently available to the developed parts of the world,37 where ship recycling is virtually nonexistent.38 Further encouragement for research and improving technology without addressing the

33

Jesper Loldrup & Edward Kleverlaan, IMO, EGM on Oceans, Seas, and Sustainable Development: MARITIME
TRANSPORT at Rio +20 (June 20-22, 2013), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/
1780IMO%20presentation.pdf.
34 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.2.
35 See MEPC, Recycling of ships: Report of the Second Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on Ship
Recycling, ¶ 15, IMO Doc. MEPC 56/3 (2007).
36 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.4..
37 Industry Overview: Ship Breaking Industry, GOOD RETURNS (May 30, 2011, 1:30PM), https://
www.goodreturns.in/news/2011/05/30/industry-overview.html.
38 John F. Sawyer, Shipbreaking and North-South Debate, Economic Development or Environmental and Labor
Catastrophe, 20 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 535, 541 (2002).
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core issue of how Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, holding major shares of this global industry,39
would finance access to such technologies, does not make any real sense.
D. Approach to Downstream Management of Hazardous Waste.
The proponents of the HKC suggest that downstream management of hazardous waste
produced from recycling of ships is purely a domestic enterprise and beyond the jurisdiction of
intentional law.40 This argument disregards the fact that an EOL ship is itself hazardous waste in
its unbroken condition. Any further processing of the ship merely amounts to transformation
from one type of hazard to another. This is a classic case of the transboundary aspect of pollution
in international law.41 An absence of recognition of such a downstream venture under
international governance would further promote a race to the bottom.
E. Definition of Ship in the Hong Kong Convention.
Although this ship recycling convention is intended to cover mostly EOL ships, it
includes other non-ship objects operating in the marine environment.42 These include floating
crafts, self-elevating platforms, floating storage units, floating production storages, and
offloading units. 43 Vessels that have lost the propulsion power, have been stripped of equipment,
or are being towed are also included.44 Ships of less than 500 GT 45 or ships operating throughout
their lives only in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the recycling states whose flag the ship is
entitled to fly, are excluded.46 The HKC did not however clarify if non-ship structures would fall
under this tonnage exception. If not, keeping the ships below 500 GT out of jurisdiction seems
39

Noting that Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and China share 94.9% of all global ship-breaking. See UNCTAD reveals
top 5 ship-owning countries, SAFETY4SEA (Nov. 3, 2017), https://safety4sea.com/unctad-reveals-top-5-ship-owningcountries-2utm_sourcesafety4seautm_mediummajors/. China mostly breaks its own ships and the international
outcry for health and environment in ship-breaking does not apply to China as it uses green ship recycling methods,
namely pier breaking. The practical area of application of this convention is three South Asian countries, namely
Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, based on the last 40 years of recorded of ship recycling.
40 See GMS Leadership, IHS, YouTube (Sep. 6, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=4SDUWaa8Tgc&feature=emb_logo.
41 Art. 195 of UNCLOS states “[i]n taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment, States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another
or transform one type of pollution into another.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 195, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
42 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 2.7.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Gross Tonnage.
46 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.3.
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aimless. It can be argued that many of the same provisions of the convention would still be
almost impossible to apply to a small ship as little as 500 GT equally with a Very Large Crude
Career (“VLCC”) or super tanker, i.e. over 400,000 GT. However, the convention does not make
any sensible distinction between such a great variance of ships.
F. Definition of Ship Recycling Activity.
The HKC defines the ship recycling activity as a complete or partial dismantling of a ship
at a ship recycling facility to recover its materials for reprocessing and reuse while taking care of
the hazardous substances.47 The process includes associated operations such as storage and
treatment of components and materials on site, but not their further processing or disposal in
separate facilities.48 It appears that ship recycling activities are entirely restricted to whatever is
happening inside the boundaries of a recycling facility. By excluding downstream processing of
hazardous materials outside the areas of the facility, the convention contemplates a separate
domestic regulatory regime to govern those activities. Generation and disposal of hazardous
materials at a ship recycling facility is an ongoing process and an inseparable part of a ship
dismantling operation. It’s difficult to discern how a domestic plant expects to run recycling
activities competitively in the global market without first ensuring a suitable global regime on
downstream waste management. Yet, the enforcement of the convention is not conditioned upon
existence of any such indivisible global regime.
G. Uncertainty in the Range of Recycling Activity and the Prediction of the
Convention.
The convention has failed to determine the precise point where the owners of an EOL
ship would be subject to the convention’s jurisdiction. There are certain obligations imposed
upon the owners of ships for preparatory works before the ship is delivered to the facility for
recycling.49 However, the convention is silent on the practice of ship owners reflagging their
ships or transferring title to some momentary owners known in the industry as ‘cash buyers,’
sometimes even just moments before the ship is delivered to the facility. The convention does not
address how the obligation contemplated above would be satisfied by so called “fly by night”
47

Id. at art. 2.10.
Id.
49 Id. at Reg. 8.3.
48
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entities or “cash buyers” within such a small fraction of time. As mentioned before, most of the
changes in ownership take place at the recycling state’s anchorage site.50 These phenomena inter
alia have led the critics to diminish the significance of the convention, as it appears to impose no
more than a paper obligation upon owners of EOL ships. 51
The convention aims to fulfill its objectives through a ‘cradle-to-grave’ strategy which
renders the jurisdiction applicable throughout the ship’s operative life.52 This begins from the
prohibition against the usage of certain hazardous materials at the designing and construction
stage of any new ship.53 This is an attempt to tackle the problem from the source. However, the
deliberate shirking of the convention from the downstream management,54 might jeopardize the
whole ‘cradle-to-grave’ objective, if these wastes cannot ultimately be managed in a safe and
sound manner. The waste may eventually escape oversight after transportation to an unregulated
domestic facility and may end up directly in the sea, which is not an unusual phenomenon in
developing countries.55
H. Delegation of the Task of Recycling to Third Party by the Ship Recycling
Facility.
It appears that anyone who steps into the shoe of an authorized recycler even for a single
ship recycling activity on a temporary lease, may also be considered a ‘ship recycling company’
subject to the full convention rights, duties and responsibilities.56 It will be interesting to see how
the non-compliance of convention’s provisions by a temporary delegate would impact the
original owner’s convention obligation and right to operate or renew the facility at the end of its

50

Dr. Nikos Mikelis, The shipowner, the Cash Buyer, and the new European Regulation, Green Recycling
Conference (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.gmsinc.net/gms/pdf/2013-11-18_GMS_Tokyo_Conf/
The_shipowner_the_Cash_Buyer_and_the_new_Eu_Regulation.pdf.
51 Interview with Syeda Rizwana Hasan, winner of the 2009 Goldman Environmental Prize and CEO of Bangladesh
Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), Head Office, Dhaka, Bangladesh (Aug. 12, 2016).
52 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 2.
53 Id. at Reg. 4.1.
54 Id. at Reg. 2.10.
55 It has been noted that in some developing nations, such as the Philippines, land-based disposal systems include
discharging waste directly into the sea. See John R. Lethbridge, Transportation, Water and Urban Development
Department, World Bank, Infrastructure Notes: MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships) (1991), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTRANSPORT/Resources/
336291-1119275973157/td-ps4.pdf/.
56 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 2.12.
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term. In the absence of clear safeguards provided by the convention, delegation of authority
might open the door to abuse the process of law. A recycler may simply attempt to set up a shell
company to purposefully shift the legal burden, allowing it to keep the full beneficial interest, but
remain unharmed by the convention’s obligations.
I. Sailing Under the Authority of a Flag: An Innovative Approach of the Hong Kong
Convention.
The convention applies to “ships entitled to fly the flag of a party or operating under its
authority” and “‘ship recycling facilities’ operating under the jurisdiction of a party.”57 Therefore,
a ship that does not carry a party flag but operates under the authority of a party is covered by the
convention. It is however not fully clear what the convention means about operating under a
party’s authority even without being registered with a party’s flag. Further clarification may be
required when introducing a term unfamiliar to maritime world. For example, beaching is often
carried out in a flagless status, especially when a cash buyer does not wish to reflag the ship after
taking the delivery of the ship from the anchorage of a recycling state. In such a case, any dispute
around the questionable beaching or processing at a substandard facility may be attributed to the
recycling state only, outside of the convention’s jurisdiction. In absence of any flag, arguably, the
beaching maneuvering is carried out under the sole authority of recycling states. This could be an
attempt of the convention to hold no one accountable for the controversial act of beaching in
substandard facilities.
J. Relinquishment of Essential Jurisdiction with No Good Reason.
The HKC expressly excludes war ships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned and
operated by a party while used for government and noncommercial operations.58 A war ship by
design in its nature and character can be more threatening to human health and the environment
while undergoing disposal operations. Built-in weaponry and specially designed ammunition
pose greater threats than ordinary merchant ships. These warships deserve stricter regulation.59
Making a distinction over the application of the convention based on ship’s structure and use
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Id. at art. 3.1.
Id. at art. 3.2.
59 Saurabh Bhattacharjee, From Basel to Hong Kong: International Environmental Regulation of Ship-Recycling
Takes One Step Forward and Two Steps Back, 1 TRADE L. DEV. 193 (2009).
58
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may be logical on the grounds of security, sovereignty, or operational capabilities. However, it
makes little sense to exclude them from the convention’s jurisdiction after their operating lives
are over and they become waste. Governments might use vessels of same category as other
private commercial operators. When a government or Navy EOL ship is sold to a cash buyer or
directly to a yard owner for scrapping, they don’t appear to further sovereignty based interests
anymore. There are more than 33,000 ships of less than 500 GT operating in international
waters.60 The lifetime of each of those vessels is expected to be the same as the large oceangoing vessels. Collectively they might produce a significant amount of hazardous waste when
recycled after their operative lives,61 but the convention does not apply to these vessels, which
are, instead, exempted.62
Vessels operated throughout their lives exclusively in domestic waters, irrespective of
their sizes, are also exempted by the convention.63 By the words ‘throughout their lives’ the
convention seems to target ships that have never been engaged in cross-border movement. Thus,
most inland vessels are covered by this provision. Coastal vessels64 with shallow hulls that trade
between two points within a jurisdiction are also subject to this provision. There are many
countries in Europe along the Mediterranean Sea or in the Indian subcontinent in Asia where
coastal trading is prevalent. 65 These ships perhaps would be subjected to the convention
jurisdiction simply because of the crossing of an international border, even in a coastal route. Yet,
most ships of similar class do not involve such cross-border movement and thereby are
exempted. Many of these vessels moving within a single jurisdiction are larger than a typical
ocean-going commercial vessel but not amenable to convention jurisdiction. A significant
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The world merchant fleet - statistics from Equasis, EQUASIS (2016), http://www.emsa.europa.eu/equasis-statistics/
items.html?cid=95&id=472.
61 Noted that these ships, when built, would have no restriction to use prohibited material such as asbestos, glass
wool etc. under the convention being exempted.
62 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.3.
63 Id.
64 Coastal vessels are Coasters which are shallow-hulled vessel ships, typically ranging from 1000 DWT to 15000
DWT.
65 41% of the travel between EU members is carried out with coastal vessels. In Europe, short sea shipping is at the
forefront of the European Union's transportation policy. Roughly 41% of all freight moved in Europe is classified as
Short Sea Shipping. See Nil Güler & Osman Kamil Sağ, The Impact of European Union’s Port Policies on Maritime
Transport, ¶ 13 (2014).
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number of coastal vessels, as large as 16,500 DWT,66 are automatically exempted because of the
nature of the voyage rather than relevant characteristics allied to the safety and environment.
The convention, however, has imposed responsibilities upon state parties to adopt
appropriate measures so that those exempted vessels act consistently with its provisions.67 It is
not clear whether the convention would apply when a coastal vessel or inland vessel of a state is
exported to a recycling state abroad. Its last voyage would entail a cross border movement and
per both Basel Convention and the Hong Kong Convention, there is no exception for the end of
life journey, and the last journey is invariably part of a ship’s operating life.68 Provided the
movement takes place beyond the jurisdiction of a state, the convention should apply, but it is not
clear how the convention would address these situations.69 However, these ships are bound to
undergo a recycling process consistent with the convention as far as practicable and reasonable70
but under a separate domestic regime. This may again, allow an individual state to enjoy more
discretion in deciding what is reasonable and practical for those types of vessels.
By not clarifying the meaning of “ships operating throughout their lives only in waters
subject to the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly,” the
convention has blurred the distinction between the cross-border movement with flying foreign
flags and movement within a national jurisdiction with a foreign flag. The words “throughout a
ships life only in waters” seem to modify only to the ship’s travel within the territorial
jurisdiction of the prevailing flag state. In this situation, a short voyage could therefore be used to
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DANISH ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WORKING REPORT NO. 18: SHIPBREAKING IN OECD, 15 (2003), https://
www2.mst.dk/udgiv/Publications/2003/87-7972-588-0/pdf/87-7972-589-9.pdf.
67 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.2.
68 Id. Many EOL ships carry cargo even in their last voyage to the recycling state. The HKC has not addressed the
issue of using the EOL ship in commercial navigation.
69 There might be several predictable circumstances. Firstly, the ship may be exported even if the state is also a
capable recycling state. Secondly, the state may export it as they may not have any option of recycling ship in their
own jurisdiction. Thirdly, the ship may not have propulsion power and may be towed and delivered to the recycling
facility. In the final case, it might not even be considered as an operating ship within the provision. See HKC, supra
note 23, at art. 3.3.
70 HKC, supra note 23, at arts. 3.2, 3.3.
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overcome the domestic jurisdiction if that happens to be more rigorous than that of the Hong
Kong Convention to the domestic ship owners.71
On the other hand, the less rigorous domestic jurisdiction of a state for inland vessels may
be a preferable option for the foreign ship owners for recycling their ships. After the change of
flag and transfer of ownership, the ship can be considered as purely operating in single
jurisdiction throughout its life under new ownership and flag. It is likely that the existence of a
parallel jurisdiction within a domestic territory, coupled with the prevalence of open registry, will
tend to ruin fair competition among the contracting states even if the convention is ratified and
universally applied by all.
K. ‘No More Favorable Treatment’ Provision of the Hong Kong Convention:
A Redundant Provision.
The convention does not forbid transactions with nonparty ships, but party ships cannot
choose a nonparty facility.72 State parties are entitled to receive EOL ships flying the flag of nonparties for recycling, however they are to ensure same level of compliance when dealing with
nonparty ships.73 The convention clearly mentions that no more favorable treatment shall be
given to such ships. This is an attempt to exert pressure upon the states to join the convention
and ratify it quickly. Party ships cannot be recycled at a nonparty facility, whereas the nonparty
ships can still choose between both to party and nonparty facilities alike. This is favorable
treatment to the nonparty ships which do not need to comply with the obligations under the
convention throughout their lives until their EOL journey begins, whereas party ships are subject
to the ‘cradle-to-grave’ jurisdiction of the convention. This might discourage certain states from
ratifying the convention to avoid suffering competitive disadvantages in business. The ship
recycling states would also be exposed to similar problems by losing potential supply of ships for
recycling into their facilities from both party and nonparty states alike due to the use of open

71 A domestic

ship owner, depending on his ships class, may decide to operate its ship in international waters under
another state’s flag.
72 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.4.
73 Id.
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registry of the party ships before recycling.74 Hence it seems that contrary to the convention’s
claim, mere acceptance of ships from nonparty by a party’s facility would indirectly discriminate
between party and nonparty ships.
The convention provides detailed regulations in its annexes for ensuring a harmonized
system of survey and certifications.75 A state party is obliged to prohibit any installation and use
of hazardous materials onboard their ships flying their flags anywhere, but nonparty ships are
prohibited when these activities are carried out in few specified places such as ports, shipyards,
ship repair yards, or offshore terminals.76 It is unclear whether this jurisdiction would apply to
nonparty ships when outside the four specified areas cited above, but elsewhere in the party’s
jurisdiction such as the territorial sea or anchorage. 77 This also makes it more difficult for a party
to compete with a nonparty to the convention. 78
According to the convention, nonparty ships can be recycled in a recycling facility of a
party.79 In that case, the basis of jurisdiction of flag states in certifying the IHM and their
incentives to cooperate, remains uncertain. According to the convention, in every case only the
flag state administration remains responsible for verification of the IHM, including the last
survey before recycling.80 It is therefore unsettled how a survey report issued by a nonparty flag
state could bind the competent authority of the recycling state who is a party to the convention.

74 This

can become more exaggerated by the FOC doctrine by which even a party ship can just easily change its
flags and send the ship to the nonparty facility without intending to be governed by the convention provisions. These
would naturally give it a huge competitive advantage over other rule abiding ship owners and is currently a common
phenomenon in world ship recycling industries.
75 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5.2.
76 Id. at Reg. 4.2.
77 The convention is silent about the point, although it clearly contemplates nonparty ships in territorial sea. A
coastal state has unlimited jurisdiction over all (including foreign) activities unless restrictions are otherwise
imposed by law. All coastal states have the right to a territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles from the baseline.
See Simon O. Williams, Law of the Sea Mechanisms: Examining UNCLOS Maritime Zones, THE MARITIME
EXECUTIVE (Dec. 1 2014), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Law-of-the-Sea-Mechanisms-ExaminingUNCLOS-Maritime-Zones-2014-12-01.
78 However, from the perspective of the convention, this is perhaps another example of unequal treatment between
party and nonparty ships contrary to art. 3.4 of HKC. To carry on installation of the prohibited material or equipment
with such material, a ship does not need to birth in port or terminal but also possibly in anchorage.
79 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 3.4.
80 Id. at Reg. 10.4.
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L. A Universal Technical Method for Diversified Technical Needs.
The HKC incorporates technical details in its regulations.81 The convention requires each
party to give full and complete effect to the provisions of the convention including these
technical provisions. 82 It requires that each party and its ship recycling facilities comply with the
convention as set forth.83 However, parties that rely on various ship recycling methods including
beach breaking, pier breaking, dry-docking, and landing, all differ technically from one another.
There is a gulf of difference in the technical standards of dry-docking and beach breaking, which
are technically unmatchable. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the state parties relying on
sharply contrasting technical method of recycling would attempt to give uniform, full, and
complete effect of its technical provisions as required by the convention.84
M. Inconsistency in Approach with Inbuilt Hazardous Materials.
The HKC lists hazardous materials in appendixes 1 and 2. Appendix 1 lists asbestos,
ozone depleting substances, PCB, and anti-fouling components and systems. Appendix 2 lists
nine other toxic materials including those mentioned in appendix 1.85 These hazardous materials
usually remain part of the ship’s inbuilt structure. It is an obligation upon the parties not to allow
installation of materials listed in appendix 1, no matter where in the world the ship is, whether at
sea or at shore.86 Also, it prohibits vessels carrying flags of a nonparty to install such materials
when the ship is at their ports, shipyards, ship repair yards, or any offshore terminals.87 This
provision does not say anything about forbidding ships to use or install materials listed in
appendix 2. Arguably appendix 2 materials could be used or installed in ships by a party or
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Bhattacharjee, supra note 59, at 221.
HKC, supra note 23, at art. 1.1.
83 Id. at arts. 4.1, 4.2.
84 Note that dry-docking and beaching pose radically different risks in terms of safety and environmental ecology. In
beaching, 100% containment is impossible, which is unlike dry-docking, where it is 100% possible.
85 The list of prohibited materials was reduced to 9 in Appendix 2, and 4 in Appendix 1 after serious protest by some
ship owners. The draft convention initially included many other hazardous materials listed in other IMO
conventions, all of which have been omitted because of serious debate and pressure from the shipping delegates
except the above 13. See SAIFUL KARIM, PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT FROM VESSELS:
THE POTENTIAL LIMITS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION, 90 (Springer International Publishing
2015).
86 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 4.
87 Id. at art. 3.4.
82
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nonparty during the ship’s operating life.88 Appendix 2 also incorporates the materials in
appendix 1 reference. 89 This creates inconsistency when applying both provisions.90
N. The Hong Kong Convention’s Overdrawn Approach to the List of Hazardous
Materials Onboard.
Existing ships are required to comply with the IHM certification within 5 years after the
convention enters into force, or before the ship proceeds to the recycling yard if earlier.91
Considering the grave necessity to protect and preserve the coastal environment of the recycling
states and health of their citizens, and prevent sub-standard recycling in the industry, the burden
upon the existing ship owners appears to be crafted too flexibly. A five year timeline after the
convention has entered into force seems to be a long drawn out deal given the preparation of the
IHM, which, some experts suggest, is mostly paperwork.92 Per the convention, this could be
done through visual or sampling checks only.93 On the other hand, new ships are bound to
implement the rule right away.94 Again, the convention has used the phrase “as far as practical,”
but it did not provide any further details as to whether any impracticability would be subjectively
or objectively assessed. Ship-owners may always plead their incapability, which might be
difficult to disprove or deny. Such inspection is likely to be cursory and still pass the standard set
by the convention.
IV.

The Survey and Certifications of Ships under the Hong Kong Convention.
As noted in the convention, a ship is usually subjected to survey and certification by the

flag state in four circumstances.95 The initial survey96 is made when a new ship is built and
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Id. at Reg. 5.3.
Id. at Appendix 2.
90 In any case, it is open for a party ship to install prohibited material in a nonparty state by reflagging the ship.
91 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5.2.
92 Interview with Md. Golam Kibria, Chief Engineer (Marine Engineer Officer Class -1 , UK) Country Manager,
Bureau Veritas (Bangladesh) Pvt. Ltd., Dhaka (Aug. 25, 2016). See also Interview with Captain K.M. Jashimuddin
Sarker, Master Mariner (Class-1, UK) Chief Nautical Surveyor (CC), Department of Shipping, Govt of Bangladesh,
Dhaka (June 30, 2016).
93 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5.2.
94 Id. at Reg. 5.1.
95 Id. at Reg. 10.
96 Id. at Reg. 10.1.1.
89
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begins operation, that is followed by the renewal survey after every five years.97 An additional
survey would be needed if any changes are made during the ships operational life that may affect
the onboard hazardous materials in its structure.98 A final survey is made before the ship departs
for recycling.99 The main thrust of the convention’s ‘cradle-to-grave’ approach is to maintain an
unbreakable chain throughout a ship's life cycle from its birthplace to the deathbed.100
Ownership of a vessel usually changes many times in its lifetime. The convention aims to
ensure that all information on shipboard materials that may be a potential cause of hazard to
health and environment are communicated effectively to the last dealmakers i.e. the recyclers.
This helps the recyclers to plan and manage the hazardous waste in a safe and environmentally
sound manner. To continue with this goal, the convention introduces an additional survey in case
any structural changes take place, or other significant changes occur for example in ship's
fittings, equipments, arrangement, and materials.101 This additional survey is consistent with the
‘cradle-to-grave’ approach but the obligation to get the ship surveyed by the flag state in such
circumstances seems optional, and depends on the ship owner’s requests.102 This is an instance of
self-governance and the discretion sits improperly with other obligations on IHM survey and
certifications as set forth by the HKC. IHM survey and certifications appear to be the pivotal
responsibility imposed upon ship owners under the convention, but the irregularity, as pointed
out, might destroy the whole substance of those provisions.
The flag state’s administration is responsible for IHM survey and certification throughout the
ship’s lifetime and when the ship is delivered to the facility for recycling.103 Additionally, the
flag state has the duty to confirm if the Ship Recycling Plan (SRP) is consistent with IHM
97

Id. at Reg. 10.1.2.
Id. at Reg. 10.1.3.
99 Id., at Reg. 10.1.4.
100 Bhattacharjee, supra note 59, at 221.
101 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 10.1.3.
102 Shipping companies already expressed doubt about the reliability of this convention obligation. Individual ship
owners will judge how impactful this will be, as ultimately many shipping companies use their own survey system
to cover this ambiguity in a reliable and predictable fashion. See Summary on the new Hong Kong International
Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, LLOYD’S REGISTER, 6 (2009),
https://www.cdinfo.lr.org/information/Documents/IMOMarineServices2009/
EXTERNAL%20Summary%20on%20Hong%20Kong%20ship%20recycling%20convention.pdf.
103 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 10.1.3.
98
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prepared by the ship owners.104 This includes overseeing the plan prepared by the Ship Recycling
Facility (SRF) including the “enclosed space” and “safe for entry” procedures.105 The flag state
also has right to inquire and verify authorization of the ship recycling facilities. 106 After
satisfying the three matters above, the ship is issued with a ready for recycling certificate (RRC)
by the flag state.

107

Soon after the RRC is issued under the convention, the ship is immediately

cleared by the flag state for beaching. The verification of the authorization of ship recycling
facility is done by the flag state in its private capacity, both on the ship’s arrival to the recycling
state’s anchorage and on the eve ship-breaking works are to begin.108 At this belated stage, it
makes little sense to verify the authorization of a SRF, as it is almost impractical as a business
matter to outlaw the contract between ship owners and recyclers for any irregularity detected in
the authorization process. The survey about the authenticity of the recycling facility is therefore
arranged at a stage by the flag state when there is little a party can do based on the outcome of
the survey.
Furthermore, the flag state or its authorized representative has no duty to make a physical
inspection of the SRF to ensure its existing capability to efficiently handle the ship’s hazardous
material. There appears to be a power available to the competent authority (CA) to make a
physical investigation of the facility before issuing the SRP, but the CA is not contacted by the
ship owner or by the flag states before permitting the ships to proceed towards the recycling
state. Under the convention, the CA of the recycling state is also not bound to make a physical
inspection before approving the SRP, which can be approved after 14 days of filing the
application for the SRP.109 The SRP is a ship specific document. Each inspection is unique and
identifies the materials that deserve a direct, prompt, and detailed consideration. There appears to
be a substantial concession made from the perspective of both flag and recycling states, in the
verification process of the SRP, at the cost of workers’ safety and environmental protection.
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Id. at Reg. 10.4.1.
Id. at Reg. 10.4.2.
106 Id. at Reg. 10.4.3.
107 Id. at Reg. 11.11.
108 Id. at Reg. 4.3.
109 HKC, supra note 23, Reg. 10.4.
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V.

The Port State Control and the Hong Kong Convention.
Under the convention, a port state control (PSC) of a party to the convention can request

the flag state to carry out Inventory of Hazardous Materials (IHM) survey.110 The port state
jurisdiction over the survey of IHM and RRC has been substantially limited by the convention. 111
In any case, however, there is little incentive for a port state to undergo an IHM survey and
certification of an EOL ship, especially when the ship is being recycled in other parts of the
world. When the port state happens to be the recycling state, the situation does not change either,
because for the port state to intervene it must have information in hand about any substantial
discrepancy in preparing the IHM that can trigger the port state’s jurisdiction for a detailed
investigation.112 As noted earlier, the PSC is not required to be informed by ship owners prior
arrival to the recycling state. The CA itself remains unaware about the arrival of an EOL ship
until the application for issuance of the SRP is forwarded by the SRF that imported the ship.113
Again, there is no set deadline to file the application, and this could be done at a later stage. Even
where the PSC believes a substantial discrepancy on the IHM exists, the convention does not
make it mandatory for the PSC to carry on inspection of the IHM.114
VI.

Hot Work and Gas Free Certifications of Ships Before Recycling.
The HKC requires the flag state to issue RRC based on an SRP approved by the CA of

the recycling state. It appears that internationally, RRC is the final clearance by the flag state,
after that, the recycling work can begin immediately after the ship is taken into the facility. The
convention did not make clear at what stage the hot work and gas free certification of ships will
be issued and who is responsible to ensure that. Shockingly, if the recycling state does not forbid
it, there is no restriction against a ship-owner to directly drive even a super tanker or an Ultra
Large Crude Carrier (“ULCC”) on the beach of the ship-breaking states in loaded and uncleaned
110

Id. at Reg. 10.3.2.
Id. at arts. 8.1, 8.2.
112 Id. at art. 8.2.1.
113 Id. at Reg. 9. Note that in current practice of beaching, e.g. in Bangladesh, importers tend to wait for the next tide
to file the application for the SRP before the Competent Authority. High tide suitable for beaching comes in 3 to 4
times a month, and this natural process negatively affects the Competent Authority's schedule of inspection.
Interview with Mohammad Ali Shahin, Coordinator in Bangladesh for NGO Shipbreaking Platform, Chittagong,
Bangladesh (Aug. 4, 2016).
114 HKC, supra note 23, at art. 8.1.
111
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conditions.115 This provision is alarming, as it widens the risk of creating a race to the bottom
with tanker recycling among the ship recycling states.
VII.

Preparation for Ship Recycling, Pre-cleaning and Approval of a Dangerous
Method.
In ship recycling, the degree of pollution and threat to the human health and the

environment varies considerably depending on the employment of recycling methods. Unlike the
green recycling methods (e.g. dry-docking), beaching does not offer the ability to fully contain
pollutants such as toxic paints, heavy metals, and dirty oils. The release of these toxic substances
to the ocean in large amounts is unstoppable in the beaching method.116 Additionally, it is
impossible to bring fire-fighting equipment and ambulances to the ship in case of an
emergency. 117 Due to the soft muddy land it is also impossible to use heavy duty cranes to lift
heavy cut sections of a ship and prevent these from falling suddenly and directly from height
onto the marine environment.118 This method, by its nature, is immensely polluting and
dangerous, but the convention has fully legitimized this method of recycling. Conducting a
sound hazardous waste management operation in the ecologically delicate coastal zone is
questionable.119
VIII. The Convention’s Role in Preventing a Race to the Bottom in Ship Recycling
Business.
No sufficient green recycling capacity currently exists in the world to address shipbreaking needs.120 In the last three decades, ship owners have consistently used South Asian
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Id. at Reg. 8.3.
Off the Beach! Safe and Green Dismantling (NGO Shipbreaking Platform, Brussels, Belgium), at 7 (2009),
http://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/shipbrea_wp2011/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/off-the-beach-report.pdf.
117 Id.
118 Shashank Bengali, Adult and underage workers risk their lives in Bangladesh's rising ship-breaking industry,
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-bangladesh-ships-20160309story.html.
119 Jain, Pruyn & Hopman, supra note 6, at 690.
120 China National Shipbreaking Association has reported recently in an IMO meeting that they have available with
them over 3 million LDT green recycling capacity per year. In Turkey, it is over 1 million per year. The EU has
enough structures readily available for the project. The current green Recycling capacity of USA is 200,000 LDT/
year. See FRANK STUER-LAURIDSEN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE GENERAL ENVIRONMENT,
FINAL REPORT: SHIP DISMANTLING AND PRE-CLEANING OF SHIPS 6-8 (COWI ed., 2007), https://ec.europa.eu/
environment/waste/ships/pdf/ship_dismantling_report.pdf.
116

148

Ungovernable Ships at the End of their Lives and the Response of the Hong Kong Convention
beaches to dismantle their ships.121 Abolishing beaching completely and ensuring a zerotolerance strategy against environmental pollution and threat to the human health would not
make sense to the ship owners for pragmatic reasons.122 As a result, an attempt has been made by
the shipping community to strike a balance by incorporating both green and non-green methods
under the same umbrella regulation. The parties to the convention have chosen the term
‘environmentally sound management,’ leaving it to parties to eventually decide the method they
wish to apply and define the meaning of environmental soundness as they deem appropriate. This
wide discretion effectively creates a competitive disadvantage to the operators of green facilities.
In short, the cost of ship-breaking varies greatly between the operation of an environmentally
sound dry-dock and a beaching facilities, even within South Asian countries.123 Under this
approach, competing for business between owners of dry-docks in a developed country with
owners of beaching yards in developing countries will be a daunting task.
IX.

Safety and Environmental Protection.
The HKC did not attempt to seize a zero-tolerance policy to the inevitable human

casualty and environmental degradation arising from ship-breaking in the beaching method.
Notably, the beaching method is the principal method of recycling of ships currently available in
the world124 and practiced, since the 1960s, only by three dominant players in global ship
recycling: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan.125 It is apparent that the convention drafters, after
realizing the impossibility of abolishing beaching methods and ensuring zero tolerance, made an
121 Aiswarya

Lakshmi, 78% Ships Dismantled in South Asian Beaches, MARINELINK (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.marinelink.com/news/dismantled-beaches-south421563.
122 Gopal Krishna Choudhary, An analysis of the creation of a global ship recycling fund in the framework of the
Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2009 WORLD
MARITIME UNIVERSITY 44 (2011), https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.bing.com/
&httpsredir=1&article=1101&context=all_dissertations.
123 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An EU strategy for better ship dismantling, at 3, COM (2008)
767 final (Nov. 19, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/ships/pdf/com_2008_767.pdf.
124 Secretariat of the Basel Convention, Technical Guidelines for the Environmentally Sound Management of the
Full and Partial Dismantling of Ships, SBC No. 2003/2 §2.2 (2003).
125 Marprof Environmental, Limited, ‘Good’ Landing vs. ‘Bad’ Beaching - and where ‘Intertidal Landing’ might fit,
MARPROF.NET (Aug. 31, 2018), https://marprof.net/marprof-environmental-ltd/blog/landing-vs-beaching-vsintertidal-landing/; see also, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE, SHIPBREAKING PRACTICES IN
BANGLADESH, INDIA AND PAKISTAN: AN INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS OF BEACHING 7-8, 35 (2016).
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indirect attempt to abate coastal pollution and the adverse impacts on health and the environment
by emphasizing the training of workers, supplying adequate Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE), emergency preparedness and response, and a system of monitoring record and
reporting.126
It is important to note that while training, using PPE, and conducting emergency drills
may help avoid unnecessary and avoidable injuries, as well as environmental contamination,
there are many hazards associated with beaching practice that are unavoidable as they involve
acts of nature. For example, a sudden fall of a heavy cut section of ship’s hull directly in water or
on workers around the vicinity cannot be prevented by any grade of PPE. The semidiurnal tidal,
up to 15-meters high, washes pollutants and toxic wastes out to sea at regular intervals, which
can hardly be avoided by any amount or training or equipment.127
X.

Pre-cleaning, Gas Free and Hot Work Certifications.
For pre-cleaning, the HKC requires ships destined to be recycled conduct operations in

the period prior to entering the ship recycling facility in a manner to minimize the amount of
cargo residue, remaining fuel oil, and wastes remaining onboard.128 The convention did not
qualify the word ‘minimize’ nor provide any standard to measure the amount up to which the
minimization of the cargo residue is required before pre-cleaning of ships begin. This could have
been made clear by using words like ‘as far as practicable using the best technology available in
the industry.’ Hence any reduction of oil, even a very negligible amount, would easily comply
with this provision of the convention. While reduction of cargo residue, fuel oil, waste onboard is
required, the HKC is silent about the most objectionable material: the hazardous waste that
remains as part of the ship’s structure.129 Once the ship is beached it is dead for all purposes, and
the opportunity to reduce oil from tanks and other residues conveniently and effectively by using
126

Jain, Pruyn & Hopman, supra note 6.
Only one ship recycling yard in Bangladesh has recently started to use floating barge with a crane to receive
heavy cut sections of ships separated from the ship’s hull. The ship’s tank top or bottom floors are used a receptacles
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128 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 8.1.2.
129 Saiful Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry: International Law and National Response,
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ship’s own power and auxiliary machineries, no longer exist. Explosions of toxic gases while
carrying out ship dismantling operations is one of the major causes of concern in all the shipbreaking fields in South Asia. 130 Yet, the convention does not provide any duty to ship owners to
ensure that ship’s enclosed spaces and fuel tanks are certified and ready for hot work or gas free
before they arrive at the recycling facility for recycling.
During negotiations of the HKC, India raised the seriousness of this issue, and all
delegates present agreed it should be addressed. India’s proposal was to ensure that, before the
ship arrives at the recycling facility, all ship owners should guarantee the fuel tanks and enclosed
spaces to be certified as gas free.131 However, no such regulation was ultimately included in the
convention. The working committee believed that regulation nine of the convention covers the
issue. Unfortunately, regulation nine merely requires the SRF to mention in SRP how the ‘safe
for entry’ and 'gas free for hot work’ conditions would be ensured, but it does not impose any
specific duty upon ship owners nor upon the recyclers to confirm it before the ship is taken to the
facility. Ultimately, who is responsible for these exceedingly important tasks is not clear. Having
failed to negotiate in IMO working group meetings to include the safe for entry and hot work
certification for all ships, India proposed to include an alternative provision, requiring at least the
owner of tankers to send their vessels after certifying the slop and cargo tank is gas free and
ready for hot work condition. 132 This proposal was vehemently opposed by the ship-owners and
later diluted, instead only requiring them to send their tankers to the recycling facilities ready for
certification for hot work and safe for entry condition, but not certified ready for hot work or safe
entry condition.133 This requirement only applies before the ship arrives at the facility, and not
before it arrives at the recycling state’s territory. This means an oil tanker can carry cargo even
on its last trip, until it reaches the recycling facility. Furthermore, this is subject to national laws,
regulations, and policies of recycling states. Hence, it eventually would remain up to the national
130

NGO Shipbreaking Platform, South Asia Quarterly Update 9 BRUSSELS 3 (Apr. 27, 2016),
http://www.shipbreakingplatform.org/shipbrea_wp2011/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/SOUTH-ASIA-QUARTERLYUPDATE-9-final.pdf.
131 See MEPC, supra note 35 at ¶ 38.2 (2007).
132 IMO, Consideration of the Draft International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of
Ships, Submitted by India, IMO Doc. SR/CONF/26 (Apr. 2, 2009).
133 HKC, supra note 23, Reg. 8.3.
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authorities to ensure whether oil tankers arrive at their territories ready for certification or not.134
As indicated earlier, this provision will promote unfair competition among the recycling states
because imposition of a cleaning requirement on the tanker owners varies under each nation’s
laws.135
For ships other than tankers there is no requirement in the HKC to ensure they are ready
for certification before the ship’s arrival at the facility. This means there is no requirement to
clean the ship’s oil tank, lubricating oil tank, sludge tank, or any other compartment containing
oily substance before its arrival at the facility. 136 This prioritizes the convenience of ship owners
and ship recyclers, and ignores the safety of workers and the environment around the facility.
There was a proposal from the European Commission for removal of hazardous materials and
gas freeing of ships before their final voyage to begin the pre-cleaning. 137 However, this proposal
did not receive any positive responses in working group meetings because of serious reservations
from certain ship owning countries and the shipping industry.138 The arguments were that the
proposal would overlap with many other provisions of the convention.139 In particular, it was
pointed out that the hazardous materials listed in annex one are part of ships’ structure and
propulsion machinery. Removal of all or even some of these would cause the ships to lose their
propulsion power and render the ship unseaworthy, making it difficult to take it to a recycling
facility that relies exclusively on beaching method of recycling.140 However, ships which have
already lost propulsion power are regularly towed to the recycling yard, so there is no
justification for sending ships in uncleaned. Ultimately, the convention did not set any precleaning requirement even for those dead vessels. Various environmental organizations
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Karim, Environmental Pollution from Ship Breaking Industry, supra note 129.
136 Fuel tanks, diesel oil, and lubricating oil tanks that are not necessarily being used for propulsion and not
connected to the ship’s maneuvering to the recycling facilities are not required to be cleaned, even before the ship is
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137See MEPC, Recycling of ships, supra note 35, at ¶ 27.
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advocated for a pre-cleaning regime to be executed by ship owning developing nations, however,
this attempt was also defeated by the shipping industry. 141
XI.

Inspection and Detection of Violations.
The Hong Kong Convention seeks the parties’ cooperation in detecting violation of ships

and ship recycling facilities. If any party has sufficient evidence to prove that a violation has
occurred, or is taking place by any ship, it may report the matter to the concerned member state
at any port or offshore terminal for further investigation. If found to be true, the port state can
impose sanctions by warning, detention, dismissal, or exclusion from its territory.142 A party can
also make a complaint against a SRF if it believes it to be operating in violation of the
convention’s obligations.143 However, it is hard to locate any incentives for a state party to
complain about a private ship or a facility functioning in other parts of the world.
Under the Hong Kong Convention, any breach by a ship or a SRF will be prohibited
respectively by the national laws of the flag state or recycling state.144 Instead of invoking
jurisdiction over a ship that violated the convention, a port state may choose to file a complaint
with ship’s flag state administration, if it so desires.145 Under the convention, the port state has
very limited jurisdiction to undertake inspection of an EOL ship for any grounds other than
verifying the validity of IHM, provided that a substantial irregularity is also brought to light.146
The question arises as to how these substantial irregularities could be discovered without first
getting on board for a detailed investigation, but that seems to be prohibited by the convention.147
If the administration is satisfied with evidence of violation adduced by a party, it can initiate
legal proceedings against the EOL ship for alleged abuse.148
The flag state must respond to the complaint promptly, but if no action is taken, it must
notify the complainant with a reason for non-action within one year from the receipt of the
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complaint, with supporting evidence. 149 An EOL ship after arrival at the anchorage of the
recycling state is expected to be taken to the facility as quickly as possible.150 Currently, in
Bangladesh,151 it takes approximately seven to ten days after the ship's arrival at the
anchorage.152 After beaching, the entire breaking process usually is completed at the facility in
around three to seven months.153 Therefore, the one year deadline set by the convention to
process the complaint is very long and, likely, would serve no useful purpose. This is the only
complaint permitted under the convention to be filed by a contracting state against an EOL ship.
The only obligation on ship-owners connected to ship recycling is to maintain an IHM certificate
on board.154 After the ship is taken to the facility, any complaint derived from the IHM becomes
superficial and redundant.
The HKC also prohibits undue detention and delay of EOL ships caused by PSC while
performing their convention obligations.155 Otherwise, PSC authority is held liable to pay
damage and compensation to EOL ship-owners. 156 This measure aims to avoid unnecessary
delays in ship recycling operations. It is noteworthy that to address an allegation against an EOL
ship attended by PSC’s authority significantly augments the discretion vested upon the flag state,
reducing it virtually to a vanishing point.157 Moreover, there exists no well established complaint
mechanism and no avenue of review, even if the reasoning offered by flag state is grossly
149
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irrational or unfounded. A similar difficulty exists regarding the filing of a complaint against ship
recycling facilities operating in a party's jurisdiction.158 The presumption of the convention that
formal complaint against a private recycling facility or an EOL ship operator operating abroad
should be initiated directly and only from a state party is devoid of practicality and not helpful.
Foreign state parties may not have enough resources, incentives, intelligence, or adequate
representation to gather and manage information on the condition of private ship recycling
facilities operating overseas.
According to the convention, any violation of its provisions within the jurisdiction of any
party are sanctionable according to the established law of the party who can either initiate a
proceeding against a ship or furnish the administrators of that ship with such information and
evidence. 159 On the other hand, in case of a ship, the convention requires that the sanctions be
established under the law of the administration where the violation occurs.160 It seems that the
traditional uninterrupted jurisdiction of a flag state is retained for EOL ships. In the global ship
recycling industry, ousting the authority of flag states and taking the benefit of more convenient
regimes of open registries in ship’s last voyage is unprecedentedly high in practice when a ship
approaches the South Asian beaches for recycling.161 In order to discourage violations, parties
are required under the Hong Kong Convention to establish adequate sanctions.162 Irrespective of
the nature and degree of a breach, there is no requirement to impose any criminal obligations
upon EOL ships, like other international waste conventions have prescribed.163 Parties are
158
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entitled to impose stricter conditions than the convention itself if they wish to do so.164 It can be
argued that this discretion is highly likely to be abused in the current uncertain condition of the
ship-breaking global market. In the present race to the bottom climate, any further clampdown by
any leading ship recycling state may either force the industry to relocate to the nearest
competitors or a more impoverished part of the world.165
XII.

Communication and Information.
The HKC has attempted to establish a clear communication and information system

among all the controlling stakeholders responsible for management and operation of ship
recycling activities. 166 Each party shall report to the organization, which shall disseminate the
information as appropriate to all state parties and the relevant stakeholders.167 It is the
responsibility of each party to collect data on ships under their registry and ship recycling
facilities operating under their jurisdictions or otherwise authorized by them.168 As ship recycling
is an international activity, information exchange is crucial to ensure a degree of transparency
and accountability between the contracting states.
The states are required to communicate the list of ship recycling facilities that they have
authorized in their jurisdiction per the convention.169 The convention provides a guideline for
authorization of ship recycling facilities,170 but it does not include any technical provision that is
necessary for the uniform application of the SRF authorization process based on different
recycling methods. The technical requirement of different ship recycling methods available
internationally sharply contradict each other.171
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XIII. The Concept of a Single Contact Point Under the Convention.
Creating a concept of a single contact point172 in each ship recycling state is a welcome
approach to avoid unnecessary administrative complexities and delays. The convention puts
responsibilities upon state parties to provide the IMO with a list of recognized organizations and
nominated surveyors which are authorized to act on behalf of the parties in the administration of
matters relating to control of ship recycling activities.173 There is also a requirement to provide
information on the specific responsibilities delegated to the recognized organization, or
surveyors and conditions of the delegation of the authority.174 The annual list of ships flying the
flag of that party to which an RRC has been issued, including the name of recycling facilities and
the annual list of ships that have been recycled in the state and their violations are to be reported
to the organization as well.175
It should be noted that, the convention imposes reporting responsibilities for any
violation of its provision committed by ships and recycling facilities 176 However, there is no
requirement to disseminate information about any contravention by the delegates of state
authorities. These delegated private entities should be accountable to the respective state
authorities as well. Information regarding their violations is material and equally important to
share among the stakeholders.
XIV.

The Responsibility of the Flag State.
The inefficiency of the open registry, particularly the gray and blacklisted Flag of

Convenience (FOC) to govern ship recycling activities has been well documented. There is
plenty of room for self-indulgence and substantive misuse by the so-called cash-strapped
developing nations in order to fill their national treasuries with a steady flow of registration
fees.177 FOC registry has already failed to prevent labor rights violations in the maritime
172

HKC, supra note 23, at art. 12.2.
Id. at art. 12.3.
174 Id.
175 Id. at art. 12.6.
176 Id. at art. 12.
177 Valentina Rossi, The Dismantling of End of Life Ships: The Hong Kong Convention for the Safe and
Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships, 2011 ITALIAN Y.B. OF INT’L L. 275, 287 (2011); see also J. Peter Pham,
An Inconvenient Flag, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES (June 14, 2011), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/
2011/06/14/an-inconvenient-flag-2/.
173

157

18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124
industry, environmental pollution, or illegal fishing. 178 The convention has not only imposed
upon the flag states sole responsibility to govern EOL ships but also limited the jurisdiction of
port states, making it difficult to exercise their usual authority. It is well recognized that the
cooperative effort between flag and port states provides a well organized maritime safety and
environmental protection system, which has proven useful over the years.179 Moreover, this was
the very reason for the development of port state jurisdiction in international maritime law in
parallel to the flag state jurisdiction in the port states territories.180 These objectives appear to
have been frustrated by this international convention, which serve none but the ship-owners and
the recyclers.
IHM and RRC certifications are the only two responsibilities the Hong Kong Convention
has imposed upon the ship-owners. These provide the basis of the ‘cradle-to-grave’ jurisdiction
of the convention. It is apparent that the convention has substantially relied on these two
certifications for ensuring safety and sound environmental management in ship recycling. The
convention has entrusted jurisdiction to flag states, which in practical terms, includes failed,
fragile, and cash-strapped nations. The convention on the other hand has significantly curtailed
port state jurisdiction of recycling states.181 As a result, the so-called ‘cradle-to-grave’ claim of
the convention is unlikely to realize its intended purpose.
Ship-breaking in tidal beaches has been operating in South Asian countries for almost
forty years. This long experience has allowed the industry to gain firsthand knowledge and
expertise about the shipboard hazardous materials and their contents. Several experts in the field
suggest that conventional transmission of knowledge of onboard hazardous material through
IHM certificates or exchanging other documents is not currently the major issue. Even where
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such reports were validly provided to any specific yard, frequent casualty at worksites, health
hazards, and environmental disasters could not be avoided in any significant term.182 According
to several experts interviewed, it is the dangerous method of ship recycling, lack of
infrastructures, workers’ skills and training, inadequate use of safety equipment, and lack of
mechanization that contribute significantly to these problems.183 Substantial emphasis has been
given to the execution of a single piece of paper, the IHM, prepared by ship owners and verified
by the flag states.184 These pieces of paper reflect the existence, amount, and location of
hazardous materials in a ship at any given time. A single certified document provided by a flag
state, however, does not ease the rigor of beach breaking of ships in tidal beaches, save lives of
workers engaged in the most dangerous occupation in the world, or reduce environmental
catastrophe according to NGOs and labor activists.185
The convention is silent on the pertinent issue of capacity of ship recycling facilities to
meet the challenge that arises in breaking vessels on tidal beaches of the ocean. Some
fundamental problems appear to be technological incapability, financial impotency, and scientific
impossibility—all are long standing issues in beach breaking of ships in all developing countries,
widely known by the industry since the 1980s. Instead of addressing these issues even in a
rudimentary sense, the convention placed heavy reliance on paperwork. In practice, this
documentation is executed by “fly by night” entities, namely the “cash buyers,” and verified by
the cash strapped flag states. 186 Undisputedly, both these entities have substantial and direct
pecuniary interest in getting their ships recycled in substandard facilities. Ironically, the role of
such entities has been legalized and firmly established by the Hong Kong Convention.

182

Interview with Mohammad Ali Shahin, Coordinator in Bangladesh for NGO Shipbreaking Platform, in
Chittagong, Bangladesh (Aug. 4, 2017).
183 Interview with Captain Mohammad Sirazul Mawla Master Mariner (UK) and Chief Operating Officer, HR Ship
Management (Government Registered Safety Agency), in Chittagong (Aug. 5, 2016); see also
Interview with Chief Engineer SM Rashed Uzzman, Class 1 Marine Engr. Marine Surveyor, Marine & Offshore
Division, Bareau Veritas (Bangladesh) Private Limited, in Chittagong (Aug. 5, 2016).
184 HKC, supra note 23, at Reg. 5.
185 Interview with Rizwana Hasan, CEO BELA, supra note 51.
186 The material by which a ship has been built can be recorded by the shipbuilder or in IMO databases against each
vessel’s IMO number or elsewhere in an electronic database that may be available online at all times. These can also
be updated by the ship-owner as and when changes are made.

159

18 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124
XV.

Recycling State’s Obligations.
Under the convention, a SRF can operate only if it is authorized by the respective CA of

the local jurisdiction.187 Parties must have mechanisms to authorize, as well as control and
monitor, all activities happening within a SRF.188 Monitoring and controlling may take the form
of verification of documents and physical inspection of the facilities and site inspection. 189 The
power to authorize, control, and monitor the SRF can be delegated to bodies recognized by the
CA of the recycling states, but the primary responsibilities would remain upon the CA.190 The
parties are obliged to notify the organization about authorities delegated to the recognized
organization.191 The authorization is given for five years at a time.192 The convention did not
consider the likelihood of conflict of interest that might lead to an arbitrary decision193 and
generous authorization of SRFs.194 There is no provision for an independent audit to evaluate the
compliance of these state entities, which have apparent vested interests that might conflict with
enforcing the HKC.
The convention has specifically mentioned two instances where the permission of
authorization may be withdrawn or suspended by the CA.195 First, approval will be suspended or
revoked if any of the conditions attached to the authorization of ship recycling facility is
violated. Setting the benchmark for the terms approval, suspension, cancellation, withdrawal, and
renewal are all matters entirely for the state parties to decide and should not be addressed within
the international convention.196 This approach has invested the parties with enormous discretion
and caused another opportunity for a race to the bottom between ship recycling states. Notably,
the other approach available, specific to authorization of a facility, is the power vested to CA to
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suspend or withdraw SRF permits. This right is exercisable when a CA is denied entry to a
recycling facility to perform its supervisory task. This power is self-evident and the incorporation
of this provision in express terms in the convention does not add any real value.
XVI. Flag States’ Role in Ship Recycling.
A flag state who is a party to the HKC, or the IMO,197 can request information from the
recycling state about the grounds for authorizing a facility.198 The recycling state must provide
such information promptly.199 The requesting state might refuse to issue a RRC if the information
is not provided.200 However, a response is unlikely to come from flag states who have
questionable record of implementation, and usually invoke jurisdiction purely for economic
motives.201 Moreover, any stringency on the matter may quickly be addressed by ship owners
through reflagging their ships to other providers, who would be more than happy to offer a much
more flexible package for recycling of ships. Under the nationality principle, it is lawful for ship
owners to take the benefit of convenience that each of the open registries offers. 202 There is,
however, no accountability of ship-owners who, in breach of good faith, voluntarily chose a
blacklisted registry to execute the IHM or the IRRC, creating a high degree of foreseeable threat
to human health and the environment. These two certificates are claimed to be linked directly to
the safety of life and preventing pollution of the marine environment. Without a doubt,
questioning an SRF’s validity by a flag state at the doorstep of the facility is unlikely to have any
practical consequences.
After receiving the SRP approved by the CA of the recycling state, the flag state is
required to verify whether the IHM complies with the convention and if the SRP accurately
reflects the IHM.203 Yet, there is no corresponding duty upon the CA of the recycling states. A
SRF owner upon receiving the RRC from flag state can take the ship right away to the recycling
197
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facility and begin the recycling operation subject to filing a report with the CA, without waiting
for an acknowledgment of receipt.204 It seems that the convention has made the recycling states
accountable to foreign flag states to protect the interest of the recycling states’ public health and
environment. Ironically, the recycling states’ interests are not protected by this transaction and
the flag states apparently have no genuine connection to protect such interest. However, they
have a notable conflict of interest in accelerating the deal. The convention has delineated the
responsibilities of stakeholders in such a way where the victim has been made responsible to
polluters and their associates.
XVII. Recognition of Hazardous Wastes.
The IMO seeks to maintain a list of hazardous materials in the different international
instruments it has adopted, but refuses to recognize the same materials when applied to EOL
ships.205 Instead of using the term hazardous waste, it uses the term “hazardous materials” to
denote the same thing. This approach can cause severe problems in integrating the body of
existing international and regional laws including the Basel Convention, the Bamako
Convention, and EU Waste Shipment Regulation. This failure to clarify the position of EOL
ships, without creating a recognized exception, would allow other exporters of goods with
hazardous waste content in structures to put forward an apparent and legitimate claim to be
exempted from the stable international transboundary waste regimes. Shipment of other
recyclable objects that contain elements such as radioactive substance and asbestos as part of
inbuilt structure in a waste product can no longer be stopped under the Basel Convention or other
waste regimes following the jurisprudence created by the Hong Kong Convention unless a clear
exception is recognized in international laws for EOL ships.
In the absence of any exception explicitly created for EOL ships, how the ship recycling
regime reconciles with other waste regimes is unclear. This creates further inconsistency in
international jurisprudence on the cross-border movement of hazardous waste. Even if an
204
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exception is recognized, another difficult question remains: what justifies a separate regime for
EOL ships from other waste regimes? It seems that creating a hidden exception for EOL ships
has made the matter impossibly complex.
XVIII. The Duties of the Ship Recycling Facilities.
The ship recycling facilities are required to prepare a Ship Recycling Facility Plan
(SRFP). The plan shall include policies ensuring workers safety, protection of human health and
environment,206 and have a system in place to provide the implementation of the plan and
achievement of its goal.207 It shall identify the roles and responsibilities of workers and
employers including: a training program for workers, 208 scheme for emergency preparedness,209
monitoring and record keeping, a system of reporting the discharge of emission, incident,
accident, occupational disease, and other adverse effects to worker's safety and human health.210
Ship recycling facilities are therefore required to establish and utilize procedures to
prevent explosions, fire and other unsafe conditions at work by ensuring ships are safe for hot
work,211 and prevent harm from a dangerous work atmosphere by guaranteeing safe for entry.212
They shall establish and utilize procedures to avoid accidents and occupational disease,213 as well
as prevent spillage and emission to avoid harmful effects on the environment and human
health.214
However, the most massive task upon ship recyclers has been imposed by regulation 20
of the HKC. Under this regulation, SRFs are required to ensure that all listed hazardous materials
are removed extensively by using well informed workers, who shall be familiar with the
convention requirements relevant to their task. 215 The workers are required to actively use the
information contained in the IHM and the ship recycling plan before and during the removal of
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hazardous materials.216 The process includes removing of hazardous liquids, residues, sediments,
substances or objects containing heavy metals, paints, and coatings that are highly flammable
and can lead to the toxic release, asbestos and asbestos containing materials, CFC, halons, and
other hazardous materials remaining in the ship's structure.217 The convention emphasizes use of
competent hands, knowledgeable skilled and equipped workers, and supervisors to handle all
these matters, but does not prohibit manual recovery of all these high grade toxic and hazardous
substances such as asbestos or other asbestos containing materials. According to all professional
organizations around the world, asbestos is an extremely dangerous substance for human health,
known to cause cancer, and thus gives rise to threats at all levels of production and handling.
There is no minimum level of exposure that does not cause a clinical effect.218 Studies have
concluded that all levels of asbestos exposure have demonstrated a connection to an asbestos
related disease.219
The words ‘equipped workers’ under the HKC do not necessarily refer to using PPE that
guarantees complete protection of fatalities. The standard is left for domestic authorities to
determine, without setting any specific criteria for useable technology, heavy equipment,
instruments, or power tools which would guarantee minimum protection for workers. The
standard set by the convention regarding ‘equipped workers,’ can be easily satisfied with a bare
minimum of PPE supplied by the SRF. Under this provision a worker’s right to be protected from
unnecessary health hazard and death has not been adequately addressed in this convention.
XIX. Ship Owner’s Responsibility.
Ship owners are required to inform the flag state in due time to arrange the final
inspection and a survey to prepare the IHM.220 The IHM is issued when a new ship is
commissioned and renewed subsequently in five-year intervals, and again when the recycling
process begins.221 This IHM certification forms the basis of the convention’s ‘cradle-to-grave’
216
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jurisdiction. However, after a ship is delivered at the outer anchorage of a recycling state, it can
be re-delivered to the SRF within a week, a day, or as little as a few hours.222 A ship may not be
re-flagged by ‘cash buyers' after the original owner withdraws the flag from the ship.223 Thus, the
beaching is often done under a flagless status. 224 Rather than strengthening a chain of
responsibility, the HKC afforded the beneficial owner of ships the opportunity to disguise and
swap their responsibility with dubious entities like cash-strapped flag states. These fly-by-night
entities or cash buyers legally assert themselves as ship-owners but never in fact engage in
shipping, and as a result the assignment of duty barely impacts them in practice. These entities
act as brokers by merely taking title in a ship for a momentary period, which has the effect of
liberating them entirely from the whole chain of liabilities.
The convention does not use any independent mechanism to verify how the bare
minimum requirements imposed on ship owners are carried out at the end. As a result, these are
carried out in a grossly autoschediastic manner.225 The scheme of open registry has traditionally
been used by ship owners as a tool for oppression, enabling violation of labor rights and tax
legislation across the maritime industry. 226 The doctrine was initially created for the private
economic interests of shipping industry in a few developed nations and was subsequently
followed by the entire shipping community out of pure financial motive.227 This doctrine is
recognized as a self-inflicted injury of the maritime industry.228 However, it has survived the
century under the theory it promotes utility by yielding the maximum benefit for people all over
the world. Using the same doctrine for the purpose of ships where no transport of goods, service
or freedom of navigation are involved promotes no public interest, and does not appear to be
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producing any such synergy. This cannot be justified under this popular moral theory of utility.
The very justification for sustaining the open registry does not harmonize with the concept of an
EOL journey or the EOL ship recycling. This controversial doctrine promotes freedom of
navigation, but is moot when discussing terminating navigation of a ship. It can be cited as a
classic example of the law being used as a vehicle of deception. The Hong Kong Convention has
offered a tacit acceptance to this controversial practice, and discloses no reasonable grounds for
what is tantamount to an official tolerance of global injustice or welcoming of further selfinflicted injury to maritime nations solely for the benefit of private interests.
XX.

Workers’ Rights, Safety and Training.
The SRFs are required to include a policy approved by governing boards, ensuring

workers’ safety and the protection of the environment, when preparing the SRFP.229 The strategy
aims to minimize and eliminate, to the extent practicable, the adverse effect on human health and
the environment caused by ship recycling,230 with a goal of continuous improvement of
procedure and standard in ship recycling operation.231 The policy would also include a wide
range of programs on workers safety.232 However, all these substantive rights come only as an
organizational policy which may not be directly enforceable by workers under labor law in labor
courts of recycling countries. A company policy usually is not directly executable by workers
unless it is consistently applied and becomes part of a contract between the worker and the
company.233 In all South Asian SRFs this employer-employee relationship does not exist in a
traditional sense.
First, almost all the workers are temporary and not directly employed by their companies,
and they are generally classified as independent contractors only. Second, all the rights discussed
above are expressed in broad terms, with no specifics. It is difficult to establish liability against
229
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an employer where it is challenging to confirm which specific right was violated. Third, an SRF
is under a duty to ensure that workers have an approved policy document available describing all
these rights expressed in broader terms. So long as these program or procedures are in place, the
provisions of the convention would be satisfied. Existence of even a rudimentary policy would
still fulfill the demand of the convention and the specific content of all such rights would remain
in the sole discretion of any individual facility. The HKC creates no universal standards
concerning the result it seeks. A facility incorporating these rights under its policies must only
take into account non-mandatory guidelines published by the convention, but has no obligation
to apply them.234 This approach to workers’ rights under the convention poses a significant
challenge to all the law abiding companies who want to ensure adequate freedom of rights for
their workers, given that tremendous degrees of unfair competition already exists within the
market.
In some areas, there appear some specific responsibilities imposed upon the recyclers,
such as worker’s training235 and safe recovery of hazardous material from the structure of EOL
ships.236 However, these provisions are not without flaws. A closer read reveals that there is no
duty on the recyclers to personally undertake responsibility for training. The requirement is only
to cooperate in the program and provide training.237 This strategy ensures that workers without
any training cannot be recruited in ship recycling work.238 However, the HKC did not make it
clear whose burden it is to bear the expenses of training and who is ultimately responsible for
any accident or injury resulting from inadequate training. Moreover, most of the workers in this
industry supplied by contractors are migrants and work only temporarily.239 It is difficult to see
how one can ensure a successful scheme of training to build a skilled and experienced workforce,
without guaranteeing the regular employment of workers. The convention is silent about
establishing a steady and professional workforce. It acknowledges the role of independent
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contractors,240 but does not clarify the accountability of an SRF for any misdemeanor of the
contractors. In the absence of any clarification, it appears that an SRF may easily circumvent its
responsibility for the workers’ death and injury at work by appointing unprofessional and
unscrupulous independent contractors. The convention requires the recyclers to engage skilled
workers with appropriate utilization of the IHM and SRP.241 There is a duty to ensure that all
hazardous materials in the inventory are identified, labeled, packaged, and removed by skilled
persons to the maximum extent.242 The convention does not, however, mandate recyclers to use
the best technology available in the market, instead it allows workers to carry out these daunting
tasks manually.243
There is a duty upon the SRF to hand over untreated hazardous materials to the
authorized disposal facilities.244 However, if there is no suitable disposal facility available in any
recycling state, interim measures have not been addressed by the HKC. According to the former
head of ship recycling division of IMO, Dr. Nikos Mikelis, who was closely associated with the
adoption of the convention, this downstream waste management is outside the maritime
jurisdiction of the IMO. 245 Ironically, the convention has been open for ratification and
enforcement since 2009 to all countries around the world without ensuring this sine qua non to
ship recycling.246
XXI. Adoption of the Hong Kong Convention and Stakeholders’ Participation.
The role of dominant ship recyclers, overbearing shipping industries, and state
representatives of serious interest in ship owning countries is notable in the negotiating stages of
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the convention.247 The environmentalists present at the meeting were hardly able to influence the
decisions.248 Reportedly there was an overtly robust appearance of the shipping industry at all
levels of the IMO meetings where the convention was mainly formulated and adopted.249 In
working group meetings, the key players from the leading ship recycling nations were
unrepresented, and Bangladesh, the largest ship recycling state in terms of volume of recycling,
was never a participant in any intercessional working group meeting.250 In fact, there was fierce
opposition by the shipping industries and ship owning countries to many sensitive provisions,
such as the inclusion of a list of hazardous materials as provided in other IMO conventions251
and the necessary pre-cleaning of ships before they are exported to the recycling states.252 These
matters were formed part of the draft convention originally but were subsequently deleted from
the convention on grounds that were mostly untenable.
The proposals of the European Commission for a final survey, an inventory of hazardous
materials, a ship recycling plan, arrangement for removal and safe recovery or disposal of
hazardous materials before the final voyage, and gas-freeing were all rejected.253 It was argued
that the European Commission’s proposals contradict many other provisions of the
convention,254 without clearly indicating which provisions are contradictory and why these
contradictions are unreconcilable. The Indian proposal to implement a certification requirement
for ships’ tanks was acknowledged as a critical issue by all participants in the meeting, but in the
end, it was rejected outright without any cogent explanation for its deletion from the draft.255 At
least a trimmed version of this law has been accepted despite vigorous opposition by most of the
delegates from shipping companies. The limited law requires the ship-owner only to send a
247
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tanker to the facility ready for certification, but not yet certified ready for hot work.256 This
provision is further diluted by making the rule conditioned upon the demand of recycling
states.257 This effectively encourages the cash-strapped recycling countries to keep the threshold
low to attract more business. Based on the prevailing culture of a ‘race to the bottom’ in the large
recycling nations, it is extremely uncertain how much of this discretionary provision would
survive, if at all.
Surprisingly, it was not only the shipping industries and developed shipbuilding nations,
but also the highest bureaucrat from the IMO itself that consistently promoted the controversial
idea of tidal beaching. Considerable attempts were notable during committee deliberations.
According to Mikelis, there are some fundamental justifications for the continuation of tidal
beaching as an acceptable method of recycling of ships in international law. First, the economic
and political interests of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, who have dominated the recycling
industry for last several decades and employ this method. Second, without at least one of these
three countries, the convention cannot be enforced even if the rest of the world ratifies it.258
According to Mikelis, this convention was developed with these three countries in mind.259
It is clear from the above comments of the top IMO official on ship recycling that
inclusion of beaching method as an internationally accepted practice was a sort of compromise
with prevailing practical realities of the world’s ship recycling industry. This scenario is indeed a
result of ship owning nations exporting the costs of ship-breaking, an injustice prevailing the
world over the last three decades. It was also known to the drafters of the HKC that these
countries are unable to ensure environmentally sound management because of their financial
incapability. However, this background reality does not correspond with the comments made by
the IMO chief regarding ship recycling in connection with the drafting of the convention:
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“the underlying philosophy of the IMO Convention is to establish common standards for
all ship recycling operations, without distinction as to which part of the world they take
place, or the economic situation of the country in which they are carried out.”260
Read together, this evidences the continued inconsistency and vagueness around fixing a
sound policy, a recurring issue in the convention. The above statement by the IMO chief of ship
recycling contradicts the earlier intention of the proponents of this international convention.
Although the proponents claimed that the instrument is applicable universally irrespective of
geopolitical and economic circumstance of the member states, the drafters of the convention
have chosen a criterion that is applicable only to a specific geographical location. The cost
involved in beaching and the cost of dry-docking varies so significantly that it is impossible to
sustain ship recycling business when these two are considered in otherwise equivalent terms in
the same domestic market. In the international market the situation is worsened with a vast
difference in labor cost261 and standards of safety and environmental regulation, especially when
comparing developed and developing countries. Indeed, sustaining a competitive dry-docking
business in a developing country becomes next to impossible.
It is clear the IMO cannot deny that the regulation of SRFs would mostly apply to the
three developing countries mentioned as a practical matter. The drafters were aware that the
convention is setting a high threshold of standard in safety and environment that is virtually
impossible in the current economic climate of those states. The HKC has attempted to almost
entirely relieve the ship owners from core responsibilities to address the negative externalities
involved in ship recycling. This approach has resulted in shifting the entire burden to ship
recyclers, who happen to be members of the most impoverished part of the world. This issue was
addressed delicately by the convention. The convention reserved vast discretion in the standards
of performance by ship recyclers so that virtually all obligations of the convention can be met
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even by a low performer in recycling state. A great deal of legal loopholes and convoluted
language have been used by the convention to camouflage the responsibilities of dominant
stakeholders both nationally and globally.262 The failure of the European Commission, NGO
activists, and leading South Asian ship-breaking governments to ensure basic provisions to
safeguard their interests can be seen in the HKC’s final version.
India’s extreme disappointment expressed before the conference of the parties to the
Basel Convention is noteworthy. The meeting was about the massive failure to secure a
minimum metric in almost all the sensitive issues covered by the ship recycling convention.
India’s failure is equally shared by the leading ship recycling nations of South Asia. Although
abundant in population and workforce, these countries have lacked the capacity to ensure the
basic infrastructure and funding needed for a safe and environmentally sound ship recycling. The
proponents of the convention, dominated by the shipping industries and shipping nations,
atrociously reject this reality. Accordingly, the Basel COP adopted the following decision in a
categorical term:
"The Conference of the Parties . . . [i]invites the International Maritime Organization to
consider further incorporating clear responsibilities of all stakeholders in ship recycling,
including ship owners, ship recycling facilities, flag States and ship recycling States, also
taking into account their current capacity and the common but differentiated
responsibilities and sovereign rights of the Parties.” 263
XXII. Conclusion and Recommendations
The above discussion has identified the following policy issues, which are recommended
to the International Maritime Organization for possible implementation in future. This includes a
mandatory funding arrangement to develop infrastructure in ship recycling states through
contributions from various stakeholders including ship-owning nations, flag state nations, ship
recycling states, international organizations, donor agencies, and ship recyclers’ and owners’
associations under the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. This funding
should be administered and distributed proportionately by competent international organizations
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to ship recycling states based on previous five year record ship recycling by tonnage processed.
This should also be reviewed every five years. More specific recommendations include:
(1) A single journey exception to be created for EOL ships under the authority of the flag
of the recycling states where the vessel is destined for recycling. Under this special
end of life voyage, there should be no cargo carried onboard.
(2) Taking undue advantage of the Flag of Convenience (FOC) and freedom of navigation
with black- and gray-listed flags should be prohibited for the end of life vessels whose
owners have decided to end navigation in international waters in order to scrap
vessels. The administration should be taken over by flag states of the contracted ship
recycling states before its last voyage begins.
(3) Introduction of a consent requirement from competent authority of recycling states
before exporting EOL ships for recycling to a recycling state. A precise, streamlined
procedure of communication may be implemented for this purpose.
(4) Separate and defined responsibility should be ensured for all intermediary stakeholders
approved by the convention including cash buyers, contractors, sub-contractors, and
leaseholders of authorized ship recycling facility in ship recycling states.
(5) Ensure uniform technical and financial provisions for beaching methods in
international law.
(6) Arrangement to compensate recycling states, for environmental degradation and
enhanced casualty arising out from beaching method, should be ensured by
introducing the polluter pay principle. These provisions can be enforced against each
ship from the end of ship recycling states according to a standard policy.
(7) Record the IHM for a given ship against each ship’s IMO number, and make records
available online at the cost of ship-owners. These document may be updated as soon as
a new inspection, or any structural change is made. This provision would not remove
the requirement to hold a hardcopy of IHM onboard.
(8) The ship-breaking labor regulations should be harmonized among ship recycling
states, taking account of the special risks involved in ship-breaking work.
Alternatively, a separate regime in international law (similar to the Maritime Labor
Convention) incorporating the special rights of ship-breaking workers should be
considered.
(9) Standardization of worker training for ship-breaking and creation of a pool of
minimum number of permanent workers should be ensured.
(10) Enhance penalty provisions for intentional violation by ship owners and ship
recycling facilities, and ensure a swift complaint procedure.
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(11) A clear and uniform disclosure policy about the activity of EOL ships and ship
recycling facilities should be introduced in all ship recycling countries to enhance
public accountability.
(12) Mandatory liability insurance for pollution liability and workers injury.
(13) Abolish manual work to the maximum degree possible based on the feedback
received from the stakeholders.
(14) Standardization of downstream waste management services across ship recycling
nations.
(15) An amendment to the convention as soon as possible, focusing on three fundamental
areas: ship recycling method, pre-cleaning method, and the distribution of the fair
share of financial responsibility, based on feedback received from major ship recycling
states.
Without a doubt, the Hong Kong Convention has posed a potential threat to all three
leading ship-breaking nations by promoting race to the bottom among these economically
vulnerable countries. If fundamental issues such as ship-owner’s liability, responsibility of states
having jurisdiction over EOL ships, sources of funding, externalization of negative costs to
coastal environment of ship-breaking nations, are not adequately addressed as recommended, the
real contributions of this much awaited convention for this global industry of ship-breaking
would amount to too little, too late.264
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